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The appointment of executive heads
in UN treaty-based organizations
Francis W. Hoole
The research reported in this article seeks to understand how and why individuals are
appointed to serve as executive heads of international organizations. A simple
statement of the behavioral rule used in selection of executive heads is developed in
the form of an executive head appointment function. The type of data available for
the analysis of the appointment of executive heads in international organizations is
identified, and an empirical examination of changes in emphasis in the selection of
executive heads is reported. The executive head appointment function utilized in the
study views appointment as an executive head as a function of six factors (three organi-
zational, one national, and two personal). Discriminant function analysis is used
to determine if the function would distinguish between individuals appointed during
the period 1945-57 and those appointed from 1958—70 as executive heads in UN
treaty-based organizations. It is possible to distinguish, on the basis of the specified
executive head appointment function, between executive heads appointed during the
two halves of the time period under study. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that
the emphasis involved in the selection of executive heads has changed over time in
UN treaty-based organizations.
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Institutions Internationales for facilitating the final writeup by providing office space and
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92 International Organization
Introduction
Studying policy makers has been one of the favorite pastimes of international
organization scholars. For example, considerable attention has been devoted to
various aspects of the international civil service, election of individuals to interna-
tional parliamentary leadership positions, the political role of specific secretaries-
general of international governmental organizations (IGOs), the overall impact of
executive heads in shaping activities undertaken by international organizations,
behavior of governmental representatives in public meetings, and attitude formation
by delegates to international conferences. Unfortunately, no systematic compara-
tive study has previously been reported which focuses on the appointment of
executive heads in international organizations.1 The research reported in this article
was undertaken to correct that oversight and has as its concern the understanding
of how and why individuals are appointed to serve as executive heads of interna-
tional organizations.
There are a variety of legitimate research approaches which could be utilized
in this study. The historical approach emphasizes the reconstruction of particular
events. The legalistic approach focuses on constitutional provisions, laws, treaties,
regulations and legal bases for action. The ideological approach orients analysis
around sets of beliefs. The behavioral approach emphasizes behavior, assignment of
numerical values to empirical evidence, and statistical analysis. Other approaches,
naturally, emphasize other factors. Because of availability of data and the personal
preference of the author the work reported here falls within the behavioral
tradition. The article exhibits the general advantages and limitations contained in
that approach.
The research is purposely exploratory in nature. A simple statement of the
behavioral rule used in the selection of executive heads is developed in the form of
an executive head appointment function, the type of data available for the analysis
of the appointment of executive heads in international organizations is identified,
and an empirical examination of changes in emphasis in the selection of executive
heads is reported. While the agencies studied, UN treaty-based organizations, and
the years examined, 1945-70, may present biases in regard to the population to
which generalizations eventually should be addressed, the study, nevertheless,
examines data that is probably not too atypical. Hopefully the article provides a
foundation for additional study. It begins with a presentation of the theoretical
orientation utilized in the research, moves to operational considerations and then
reports on the empirical examination of changes in emphasis in the executive head
selection process. It ends with a statement of the study's conclusion and suggestions
for further research.
1
 The background characteristics of certain secretaries-general of international nongovern-
mental organizations have been collected by Lawrence Young and Kjell Skjelsbaek. See
Lawrence J. Young, "Secretaries General in International Non Governmental Organizations
(INGOs)," International Associations 1971/7 (August-September 1971): 396-403; and Kjell
Skjelsbaek, "A Survey of International Nongovernmental Organizations-2," International
Associations 1974/6-7 (June-July 1974): 352-4.
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Recruitment patterns 93
Theoretical orientation
The appointment of an individual to serve as executive head is one of the
most important actions taken by an international organization and is usefully
viewed from a policy-making perspective.2 A policy is a course or line of action. An
action is a deed or behavior, such as the appointment of an executive head. A
decision is a choice among alternative actions. A policy-making process consists of
the series of activities involved in making and executing decisions. In IGOs this is a
political process where a number of policy makers become involved in a struggle
over a variety of organizational actions. This process is highly structured and
complex, and can be viewed as a system. Inputs into the system consist of
information which comes into the policy-making process. Outputs are the system's
products, called actions. The system is the mechanism, called a policy-making
process, which transforms inputs into outputs. Feedback consists of information
regarding results of actions, and is fed back into the system as a subsequent input.
It is, of course, the participants in the policy-making process who bargain and
negotiate over proposed actions, evaluating inputs into the system and deciding on
actions for the organization. In engaging in this activity they develop patterns of
behavior which can be stated as policy-making rules. A policy-making rule is the
calculus by which information coming into a policy-making process is transformed
into organizational action. Such a rule expresses outputs as specific functions of
particular input variables and can be viewed as a formal statement of the behavior
of policy makers on a specific issue.
When deciding on the appointment of an individual to an executive head
position in an international organization the policy makers take into account a
variety of personal, national, and organizational factors. Thus Z = f(X1; X2, X3),
where Z is appointment as executive head, Xi is a vector of personal characteristics,
X2 is a vector of characteristics of the appointee's native country, and X3 is a
vector of organizational characteristics. When the exact variables and the mathe-
matical form of the function have been fully specified this statement will be
regarded as the executive head appointment function and viewed as the behavioral
policy-making rule used for the appointment of executive heads in international
organizations.
The focus of this article will be on a systematic examination of whether the
emphasis on personal, national and organizational factors in the selection of execu-
tive heads has changed over time in UN treaty-based organizations.3 This will be
2
 For an elaboration of the policy-making perspective presented here see Francis W. Hoole,
Politics and Budgeting in the World Health Organization (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University
'ress, forthcoming).
3
 The acid test of such a function would be the evaluation of its ability to make accurate
>redictions about future appointments. Furthermore, a strong empirical test would include
ome individuals who were appointed and some who were not. This type of test would create
in interesting variation in the dependent variable and would set up an evaluation of the
unction's ability to predict or postdict appointments and non-appointments. Unfortunately
lata for those tests are currently not available to me. To date I have been able to obtain only
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94 International Organization
done by asking whether it is possible to distinguish, on the basis of a fully specified
executive head appointment function, between executive heads appointed during
the first half of the period under study and those appointed later. Because an
important part of the specification of the function involves reducing the ambiguity
contained in general terms like "personal," "national," and "organizational" by
identifying specific personal, national, and organizational variables, and because the
assignment of a value for each variable to each individual is important, let us turn to
a consideration of the operational aspects of the study.
Operational considerations
During the twenty-six year period being studied a total of forty-seven indi-
viduals from nineteen different countries assumed the position of executive head of
one of the agencies in the sample. The names of these individuals, together with
their country, organization, term of office, age upon assuming office, and prior
experience in their agency's secretariat are presented in table 1.4 A quick glance at
the list of names indicates that many of the well-known leaders in the history of the
United Nations system are included. Founding fathers like Trygve Lie and Brock
Chisholm are there, along with other famous executive heads like David A. Morse,
Dag Hammarskjold, U Thant and Robert S. McNamara. The data reveal that the
appointees averaged fifty-five years of age when assuming office, served for an
average of six years, and eleven of the forty-seven appointees had prior service in
data on the individuals actually appointed. Thus the examination of whether the details (either
the values of the variables or the weights given to the variables) concerning the factors
contained in the function have changed is all that is proper at this time.
"The data reported in table 1 were collected from the following sources: Yearbook of the
United Nations (New York: United Nations, 1947-70); The International Who's Who, Thirty-
Seventh Edition, 1973-74 (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1973); The International Who's
Who, Thirtieth Edition, 1966-67 (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1966); The International
Who's Who, Twenty-Seventh Edition, 1963-64 (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1963); The
International Who's Who, Nineteenth Edition, 1955 (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1955);
The International Who's Who, Eleventh Edition, 1947 (London: George Allen and Unwin,
1947); Who Was Who, 1961-1970 (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1972); Who Was Who,
1951-1960 (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1961); World Biography, Fifth Edition (Beth-
page, New York: Institute for Research in Biography, Inc., 1954); Who's Who in the World,
1st Edition, 1971-1972 (Chicago: Marquis Who's Who, Inc., 1970); Who's Who in the United
Nations (Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York: Christian E. Burckel and Associates, \95\);The Cana-
dian Who's Who, Volume XII, 1970-1972 (Toronto: Who's Who Canadian Publications, 1972);
and The New York Times, June 19, 1958, November 22, 1961 and February 20,1967, A second
person collected a randomly selected duplicate set of twenty percent of these data. There were
no intercoder differences. This was probably because the data were copied in a straightforward
manner and little coding was involved. The same procedure was used for the data in table 3 and
the same results were obtained, probably for the same reason. It is a weakness of the study that
intuition and availability of data, rather than prior explicit theoretical statements, guided the
selection of the data.
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Recruitment patterns 95
Table 1. Executive heads appointed 1945-70
Name
John Boyd Orr
Trygve Lie
Julian Huxley
Eugene Meyer
Camile Gutt
Albert Roper
John J. McCloy
David A. Morse
Norris E. Dodd
Jaime Torres Bodet
Brock Chisholm
Eugene R. Black
Fritz Hess
Leon Mulatier
Ivar Rooth
Gustav Swoboda
E.C.R. Ljungberg
Dag Hammarskjold
Luther H. Evans
Marcolino Candau
Philip V. Cardon
Marco A. Andrada
David A. Davies
Binay R. Sen
Per Jacobsson
Robert L. Garner
W. Sterling Cole
Vittorino Veronese
Gerald C. Gross
R.M. Macdonnell
Ove Nielsen
U Thant
Rene Maheu
Edouard Weber
Sigvard A. Eklund
George D. Woods
Pierre-Paul Schweitzer
Jean Roullier
Bernard T. Twigt
Manohar B. Sarwate
Michel Rahi
Mohamed Mili
Addeke H. Boerma
Robert S. McNamara
Colin Goad
Wifred Jenks
Assad Kotaite
Country
United Kingdom
Norway
United Kingdom
United States
Belgium
France
United States
United States
United States
Mexico
Canada
United States
Switzerland
France
Sweden
Switzerland
Sweden
Sweden
United States
Brazil
United States
Argentina
United Kingdom
India
Sweden
United States
United States
Italy
United States
Canada
Denmark
Burma
France
Switzerland
Sweden
United States
France
France
Netherlands
India
Egypt
Tunisia
Netherlands
United States
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Lebanon
Organization
FAO
UN
UNESCO
IBRD
IMF
ICAO
IBRD
ILO
FAO
UNESCO
WHO
IBRD
IDA
1FC
UPU
ITU
IMF
WMO
ICAO
UN
UNESCO
WHO
FAO
ITU
WMO
FAO
IMF
IFC
IAEA
UNESCO
ITU
ICAO
IMCO
UN
UNESCO
UPU
IAEA
IBRD
IDA
IFC
IMF
IMCO
ICAO
ITU
UPU
ITU
FAO
IBRD
IDA
IFC
IMCO
ILO
ICAO
Term
1945-^8
1946-53
1946^18
1946^17
1946-51
1947-51
1947^9
1948-70
1948-54
1948-52
1948-53
1949-62
1960-62
1961-62
1950-61
1950-53
1951-56
1951-55
1952-59
1953-61
1953-58
1953-
1954-56
1954-58
1955-
1956-67
1956-63
1956-67
1957-61
1958-61
1958-65
1959-64
1959-61
1961-
1961-
1961-66
1961-
1963-68
1963-68
1963-68
1963-
1963-68
1964-70
1966-67
1967-
1967-
1968-
1968-
1968-
1968-
1968-
1970-
1970-
Age upon
assuming
office
65
50
59
71
62
56
52
41
69
46
52
51
55
63
63
58
55
48
51
42
65
50
42
58
62
62
53
48
55
50
66
52
56
50
50
62
51
65
52
55
55
50
56
52
54
61
56
Prior expe-
rience in
secretariat
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
0
0
0
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
13
0
0
0
15
0
0
0
0
0
7
7
17
7
20
0
5
39
0
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96 International Organization
the secretariat of the agency which they were appointed to head. The information
in the table indicates the type of personal data available for the study of the
appointment of executive heads in international organizations. Using standard
biographical sources no other intuitively interesting personal data could be com-
piled for all appointees. The individuals in the sample were used in the empirical
examination reported in this article, with the variables age upon assuming office
and prior experience in secretariat serving as indicators of the personal charac-
teristics of the appointees.
A majority of the appointees have come from a handful of countries, with
individuals from the United States comprising twenty-six percent of the appointees
and persons from France, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States
making up fifty-seven percent of the sample. Furthermore, thirty-eight of the
forty-seven individuals (81 percent) appointed between 1945 and 1970 came from
countries located in North America or Western Europe. The data complement the
earlier findings of Singer and Sensenig, Gregg, and Weigert and Riggs that UN
officeholding (defined by them as elected offices in the UN General Assembly and
its main committees, and seats in other major UN organs which are filled by the
Assembly) is related to the capabilities, or development, of the individual's native
country.5 It was decided to use the percent of budget assessment for 1966 as the
indicator of the characteristics of the native country of the appointee in the
empirical examination reported in this article.6 These data are presented in table 2
along with a recoding of the data from table 1.
In 1966 there were nineteen-hundred and thirty-five international nongovern-
mental organizations and one-hundred and ninety-nine international governmental
organizations. One-hundred and seventy-four of the international governmental
organizations existed outside of the United Nations system while the other twenty-
five organizations were universal membership agencies inside the UN family.7
Within the United Nations system there were fourteen semi-autonomous organiza-
5
 Marshall R. Singer and Barton Sensenig III, "Elections within the United Nations: An
Experimental Study Utilizing Statistical Analysis," International Organization 17 (Autumn
1963): 901-25; Robert W. Gregg, "The Latin American Bloc in United Nations Elections,"
Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 46 (September 1965): 146-54; and Kathleen Maas
Weigert and Robert E. Riggs, "Africa and United Nations Elections: An Aggregate Data
Analysis," International Organization 23 (Winter 1969): 1-19.
'The scale of assessments from the World Health Organization (WHO) was used because it
includes all nations listed in table 2 whereas the United Nations (UN) scale of assessments does
not. Actually WHO takes the UN scale from the prior year and adjusts it for membership
differences. The budget assessments listed in table 2 were taken from Official Records of the
World Health Organization, No. 159, Financial Report, 1 January-31 December 1966 (Geneva:
World Health Organization, 1967): 17—9. Gross National Product, Gross Domestic Product or
some other indicator could have been used. Since most indicators of development or wealth are
highly correlated it probably does not make too much difference which is used for preliminary
analysis. In future analyses multiple indicators should be utilized.
7
 Yearbook of International Organizations, 12th (1968-69) Edition (Brussels: Union of
International Associations, 1969): 13.
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98 International Organization
tions in the economic and social field which were known as specialized agencies.8
These specialized agencies plus the United Nations itself comprise the fifteen
organizations reported upon in this article.
There is no such thing as a typical or normal organization in this group. In
fact, considerable variation exists in agency practices and characteristics. In order to
gain some perspective on the agencies, data were collected for 1966 on eleven
selected organizational characteristics for each of the agencies. These data are
summarized in table 3.9 As can be seen from the size of the standard deviations the
dispersion about the mean is relatively large in most instances. Furthermore,
coefficients measuring kurtosis and skewness indicate that for most variables the
deviation from a normal distribution is considerable. These findings are a reflection
of diversity among the organizations on these particular variables.
Table 3. Summary of organizational data
Organizational
characteristic
Age of agency
Number of members
Total secretariat
Total expenditures
($000)
Percent regular budget
Percent secretariat
on technical assistance
Percent assessment
largest contributor
Years between assembly
meetings
Percent members on
executive board
Number regional offices
NGOs with official
relations
Mean
29
110
1,911
37,052
69
17
25
2
21
2
63
29
19
2,716
45,556
24
16
10
2
4
3
106
Kurtosis
coefficient
1.65
.39
4.19
.49
-1.38
-1.79
.31
-.25
-.04
-.93
2.96
Skewness
coefficient
1.77
-1.05
2.16
1.27
.29
-.08
-1.31
1.16
-.65
.88
2.05
8
 In a legal sense there were only thirteen specialized agencies in 1966. The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been treated as a specialized agency because by most
non-legal criteria it is considered to be one.
9
 The data which form the basis of table 3 were collected from various documents issued by
UN agencies. This data set is available from the International Organization Data Archive of the
International Studies Association, which is located at Indiana University. A copy of the data,
intercoder reliability information and a listing of the data sources can be obtained by writing to
the author of this article. The summary statistics reported in table 3 were calculated on the
CDC 6600 Computer at Indiana University's Wrubel Computing Center. The SPSS program was
used.
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Recruitment patterns 99
In order to obtain a more parsimonious description of the dimensions along
which these characteristics fall, a factor analysis was performed. The R factor
analysis was carried out using the product moment correlation coefficient, a
principal components solution, unities in the diagonal, a cutoff of an eigenvalue of
1.0 and Varimax rotation.10 The unrotated and rotated factor matrices are pre-
sented in table 4. Three factors emerged which account for eighty-one percent of
the total variance in the correlation matrix. By looking at the final communalities it
can be seen that most of the variance in the variables is contained in the extracted
factors.
The unrotated first factor accounts for thirty-nine percent of the total
variance. As indicated by the factor loadings it is characterized by strong relation-
ships with the following variables: number of members, total secretariat, total
expenditures, percent regular budget, percent secretariat on technical assistance,
percent members on executive board, number regional offices, and nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs) with official relations. These variables are all charac-
teristic of organizations with large staffs and programs of action, and this first
dimension will be labeled the resources factor. The unrotated second factor ac-
counts for thirty percent of the total variance in the correlation matrix. This factor
is characterized by strong relationships with the following variables: Age of agency,
number of members, percent assessment largest contributor, and years between
assembly meetings. It appears to be measuring differences between agencies which
follow a pattern for international organizations established before the Second
World War and newer agencies which follow a pattern established after the founding
of the United Nations. It will be labeled the age factor. The unrotated third factor
accounts for twelve percent of the total variance and is characterized by a strong
relationship with only one variable: Percent of secretariat on technical assistance. It
will be labeled the technical assistance factor.
To clarify the interpretation of the factors an orthogonal rotation was
performed. To get an indication of the relationship among the sample agencies the
factor scores for the first two rotated factors have been plotted in diagram 1. As
can be seen the United Nations (UN), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),
World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the World Bank (IBRD) all fall into the
upper left hand quadrangle. The International Labor Organization (ILO) and
International Monetary Fund (IMF) are located nearby. It is interesting to note
10
 The factor analysis was done on the CDC 6600 Computer at Indiana University's Wrubel
Computing Center. The SPSS factor analysis program PA1 was used. Some noise may have been
introduced into the analysis because of deviation from the normal distribution by certain of the
arrays of data. I considered transforming the data, but, in the final analysis, decided not to do
so. It is my feeling that the product moment correlation coefficient is robust and partially
compensates for this problem. I chose to keep everything as simple as possible. A copy of the
correlation matrix and other details regarding the factor analysis can be obtained by writing to
the author of this article.
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Diagram 1. Plot of rotated factor scores
for organizational data
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.WMO ITU.
- 1
- 2
- 3
Factor II
age
Factor I
resources
how the International Development Association (IDA), International Atomic Ener-
gy Agency (IAEA), International Finance Corporation (IFC), Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion (ICAO), and World Meteorological Organization (WMO) are clustered together.
The Universal Postal Union (UPU) and International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) are located near each other and at some distance from the other agencies.
There is a great deal of face validity to the scaling, and thus the perspective,
produced by the factor analysis. The reason for the use of factor analysis was so
that specific values would be systematically assigned to a reduced number of
organizational characteristics, facilitating the inclusion of these organizational fac-
tors in further analysis. The rotated factor scores will be used as indicators of the
characteristics of organizations in the empirical examination reported in this article.
These scores are presented in table 5 along with a recoding of data from table 1.
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Recruitment patterns 103
It is interesting to note in table 5 that the number of appointees per
organization ranged from two to five, with an average of four for the twenty-six
year period. The average number of countries varied from a low of one (for the
World Bank Group) to five, with the average being three per agency. The average
age of appointees ranged from a low of forty-seven to a high of sixty-three, with the
average being fifty-five years. The overall organizational norm seemed to be to
appoint individuals without prior experience as a member of the secretariat of the
agency; eight of the fifteen organizations did not appoint anyone with prior
experience and only the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) appeared to
follow a practice of appointing secretariat members to the position of executive
head. The average tenure (of those no longer in office in 1970) ranged from four to
twenty-two years, with the average being six years per agency.
Thus for the purpose of the empirical examination reported in this article the
agency scores for the dimensions resulting from the rotated factor scores were used
to index organizational characteristics, national characteristics were indexed by the
percentage of assessment for 1966 assigned to the appointee's native country, and
personal characteristics were indexed by the individual's age upon assuming office
and years of prior experience in the agency secretariat.11 The appointees were
divided into those who first assumed office between 1945 and 1957 and those
doing so between 1958 and 1970. There are, of course, problems associated with
this particular set of operational procedures. For example, the indicators tap only
part of the organizational, national, and personal characteristics in which there is
potential interest and the division of appointees into groups is arbitrary. While the
operationalization is far from perfect, it nevertheless seems to be adequate for the
purpose of a preliminary examination of whether changes have taken place in the
emphasis involved in the selection of executive heads in UN treaty-based organiza-
tions.
Empirical examination of changes in emphasis
in the executive head selection process
For the purpose of the empirical analysis of changes in emphasis the execu-
tive head appointment function was specified to be of the following form: Z = a +
b ^ ! + b2X2 + bsX3 + b4X4 + bsX5 + b6X6 + e, where Z is appointment as
executive head, Xj is the resources factor score for the organization, X2 is the age
factor score for the organization, X3 is the technical assistance factor score for the
organization, X4 is the 1966 percent of assessment for the native country of the
individual, X5 is the age of the individual upon the assumption of office, X6 is the
amount of prior experience which the individual had in the secretariat, b! through
11
 Three individuals were appointed to head the IBRD, IFC and IDA at the same time. For
those appointees the IBRD data were used for the organizational indices.
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104 International Organization
b6 are parameters attached to the variables, a is an intercept, and e is an error term
to take into account circumstances not otherwise contained in the equation.
The data analytic technique used was discriminant function analysis.12 It
began with the calculation of the means for the variables for the two groups.13
Those values are presented in table 6. The differences in the average percent of
assessment paid by the appointee's native country and the average prior experience
in the agency's secretariat are the most striking. The Generalized Mahalanobis D
Square for the entire data set was then calculated. Its value was 19.64. It can be
Table 6. Mean scores for predictor variables
1945-57 1958-70
Group Group
(n = 27) (n = 20)
Resources factor score .25 -.06
Age factor score -.01 .34
Technical assistance factor score .35 -.07
1966 percent of budget
assessment for native country 12.32 6.87
of appointee
Age upon assuming office 55.59 54.85
Prior experience in secretariat .48 6.50
12
 For an introduction to discriminant function analysis see William W. Cooley and Paul R.
Lohnes, Multivariate Data Analysis (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1971): 243-86. The
acceptance of the assumptions contained in discriminant function analysis is a refinement of
the executive head appointment function. In future studies alternative ways of specifying the
function should be considered.
13
 All data analysis in this section was done on the CDC 6600 Computer at Indiana
University's Wrubel Computing Center. The BMD 5M Discriminant Analysis program was used.
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Table 7. Classification matrix for discriminant function analysis
Predicted group
1945-57
1958-70
Totals
1945-57
20
7
27
Actual group
1958-70
6
14
20
P e r c e n t h i t s = 7 2
Totals
26
21
interpreted as a X2 test which tells whether the difference between groups is
statistically significant. If the assumptions of the statistic had been met a value this
large would have been interpreted as indicating that the groups are significantly
different at the .01 level.
The discriminant function analysis yielded the classification matrix reported
in table 7.14 As can be seen the executive head appointment function adequately
discriminated between the two groups of appointees, correctly classifying thirty-four
of the forty-seven individuals (72 percent). The function predicted twenty-six
appointments for the first period whereas twenty-seven appointments were made. It
predicted twenty-one appointments for the second period whereas twenty were
actually made. These results provide support for the contention that the emphasis
The following discriminant function coefficients were used:
Resources factor score
Age factor score
Technical assistance factor score
1966 percent of budget assessment
for native country of appointee
Age upon assuming office
Prior experience in secretariat
Intercept
Function 1
2.27
2.00
3.24
.01
1.34
-.32
-38.04
Function 2
1.81
1.86
2.36
-.03
1.28
-.15
-34.60
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106 International Organization
in the selection process differed during the two halves of the period under
examination.15
The details of the classification of the individuals in the sample are presented
in table 8 along with the probability of each individual's classification into each
group. It is fascinating to study the table, examining the probability each individual
had of belonging to the group appointed during each of the time periods.
It is of particular interest to analyze the appointments which were incorrectly
classified because they may give a clue to the reason for the errors. Unfortunately
there is no obvious set of new variables which emerge from a misclassification
analysis and suggest themselves for inclusion in a revised executive head appoint-
ment function.
Conclusion and suggestions for further research
Because it was possible to distinguish, on the basis of the specified executive
head appointment function, between executive heads appointed during the two
15
 The 1945-70 time period was used because at the time the data were collected and
analyzed the 1970 Yearbook of the United Nations was the most recent one available. Recently
I have had the opportunity to verify that five more executive heads were appointed during
1971, 1972 and 1973:
Name
Kurt Waldheim
H. Johannes Witteveen
C. P. Srivastava
Anthony H. Ridge
Hafdan Mahler
Country
Austria
Netherlands
India
UK
Denmark
Organi-
zation
UN
IMF
IMCO
UPU
WHO
Term
1972-
1973-
1973-
1973-
1973-
Age upon
assuming
office
54
52
53
60
50
Prior expe-
rience in
secretariat
0
0
0
9
22
The data on these individuals were collected from the following sources: Who's Who 1974
(London: Adam and Charles Black, 1974); The International Who's Who, Thirty-Sixth Edition,
1972-73 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1972); The International Year Book and
Statesmen's Who's Who 1974 (London: Mercury House Reference Books, 1974); and Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, Annual Report 1973 (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund,
1973). These individuals were included in the second group of appointees (which became the
1958—73 group) and the discriminant function analysis program was run again. The coefficients
in the functions changed slightly. The new analysis correctly classified thirty-seven out of
fifty-two appointees (71 percent, compared with 72 percent for the prior analysis). The
Mahalanobis D Square went up slightly to 24.12 (from 19.64). The inclusion of this new data
does not seem to make much difference in the general results obtained. Secretary-General
Waldheim was the only one of the new appointees who was misclassified. He had a .34
probability of belonging to the second group. The only individual who was reclassified was
Eugene Black, who had a new probability of .503 of belonging to the second group.
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Table 8. Individual classifications
Name
Group 1 (1945-57)
John Boyd Orr
Trygve Lie
Julian Huxley
Eugene Meyer
Camile Gutt
Albert Roper
John J. McCloy
David A. Morse
Norris E. Dodd
Jaime Torres Bodet
Brock Chisholm
Eugene R. Black
Fritz Hess
Leon Mulatier
Ivar Rooth
Gustav Swoboda
E.C.R. Ljungberg
Dag Hammarskjold
Luther H. Evans
Marcolino Candau
Philip V. Cardon
Marco A. Andrada
David A. Davies
Binay R. Sen
Per Jacobsson
Robert L. Garner
W. Sterling Cole
Group 2 (1958-70)
Vittorino Veronese
Gerald C. Gross
R.M. Macdonnell
Ove Nielsen
UThant
Rene Maheu
Edouard Weber
Sigvard A. Eklund
George D. Woods
Pierre-Paul Schweitzer
Jean Roullier
Bernard T. Twigt
Manohar B. Sarwate
Michel Rahi
Mohamed Mili
Addeke H. Boerma
Robert S. McNamara
Colin Goad
Wilfred Jenks
Assad Kotaite
Group 1
probability
.91
.74
.74
.79
.39
.70
.94
.64
.97
.49
.70
.51
.45
.39
.41
.80
.65
.72
.81
.41
.96
.56
.64
.85
.39
.58
.65
.55
.38
.70
.30
.76
.15
.37
.33
.68
.27
.33
.33
.37
.04
.28
.14
.53
.10
.00
.66
Group 2
probability
.09
.26
.26
.21
.61
.30
.06
.36
.03
.51
.30
.49
.55
.61
.59
.20
.35
.28
.19
.59
.04
.44
.36
.15
.61
.42
.35
.45
.62
.30
.70
.24
.85
.63
.67
.32
.73
.67
.67
.63
.96
.72
.86
.47
.90
1.00
.34
Group
classification
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
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halves of the time period under study it is reasonable to conclude that the emphasis
involved in the selection of executive heads, as specified by the function, has
changed over time in UN treaty-based organizations. While this finding will not
surprise careful observers of the UN system it, nevertheless, is the first time this has
been systematically demonstrated.
Hopefully a more important contribution has been made by the provision of
a basis for further research through the specification of the executive head appoint-
ment function and the identification and presentation of data which can be used in
additional research. The recent volume by Cox and Jacobson has stimulated
renewed interest in the study of policy making in international organizations.16
The work of Alker and associates in the peacekeeping issue-area17 and Hoole and
associates in the budget field18 has demonstrated that it is possible to develop
complex sets of fully specified policy-making rules which appear to correspond
closely to actual activity in international organizations. If a behavioral theory of
policy making in international organizations is to be developed then various issue-
areas must be studied. Because the appointment of individuals to serve as officers
of organizations is among the important actions taken by an international organiza-
tion, the study of policy-making rules in the appointment issue-area is important.
This research should be expanded to other organizations (e.g. regional organi-
zations), other aspects of the appointment process (e.g. consideration but non-
appointment), other foci (e.g. deputies to the executive head, parliamentary of-
ficers), and other empirical indicators (e.g. organizational appointment procedures)
should be examined. This study made only a modest beginning in the development
of a set of behavioral policy-making rules regarding appointments in international
organizations. Considerable work remains to be done on the theoretical, method-
ological, and data levels. I encourage other scholars to engage in this research and
hope that the material presented in this article will be helpful in that task.
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